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Policy Levers for the
Control of Tobacco Consumption
BY FRANK J. CHALOUPKA,"
ELLEN J. HAHN**

& SHERRY L. EMERY"

INTRODUCTION

H

istorically one of the oldest and most important crops in the United
States, tobacco has become embroiled in the second half of the
twentieth century in a struggle pitting American economic interests against
public health. It is in the tobacco growing and manufacturing states that this
conflict between lives and money is particularly prominent. In Kentucky,
for example, tobacco accounted for nineteen percent of cash receipts from
all agricultural commodities in 2000, yielding over $674 million. ' Not only
is tobacco an important economic product in Kentucky and other tobacco
growing states, but it is also a cultural icon affecting many small-scale
family farms that represent generations of tobacco-growing traditions.
While the tobacco industry ranks among the most substantial and
successful economic enterprises in the United States and in Kentucky,
tobacco use remains the single leading cause of preventable illnesses and
death in the United States.' Cigarette smoking and other tobacco use
account for more premature deaths than automobile accidents, firearms,
illicit drugs, risky sexual behavior, poor diet and low physical activity, and

* Professor, UIC and Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic
Research, Director, ImpacTeen, Department of Economics M/C 144).
""Associate Professor, University of Kentucky College of Nursing and School
of Public Health, College of Medicine, Fellow, Robert Wood Johnson Foundation
Developing Leadership in Reducing Substance Abuse.
Research Specialist, Health Research and Policy Centers (M/C 275),
University of Illinois at Chicago.
1Kentucky Agricultural Statistics Service (2001), at www.nass.usda.ogv/ky.
2See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Nat'l Ctr. for Chronic Disease
Prevention & Health Promotion, Off.on Smoking & Health, U.S. Dep't of Health
& Hum. Servs., Reducing Tobacco Use:A Report ofthe Surgeon General(2000)
[hereinafter Reducing Tobacco Use].
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microbial and toxic agents combined.3 Not only do states like Kentucky
lead the nation in growing and manufacturing tobacco, but they also exceed
other states in smoking prevalence. Kentucky leads the United States in
adult smoking, with nearly one in three adults reporting current smoking,
exceeding the United States adult smoking rate of 22.7% These statistics
profoundly affect the health and welfare of Kentucky: one of every three
smokers will die of smoking-related diseases. The result is not only
suffering for the smoker and people close to them, but increased health care
costs, and lost productivity, both while the smoker is alive and the lost
years of productivity due to premature death. 5
Given the public health toll from tobacco use, state governments have
a strong incentive for intervening to reduce tobacco use. On the other hand,
given tobacco's role in employment, tax revenues, and, in selected areas,
trade balances, governments have a legitimate interest in the "health" of
their tobacco industries. Tobacco companies cite the industry's economic
contribution in attempts to combat tobacco control policy measures. Thus,
many governments have resisted taking strong action because of concerns
that effective interventions would have harmful economic consequences.
In recent years, independent economists have countered the industry's
economic argument by conducting macroeconomic analyses that examine
the net contributions of tobacco to economies, rather than the gross
contributions featured by the industry. Recent efforts by the World Bank,
in partnership with the World Health Organization ("WHO"), also have
addressed these concerns.
The purpose of this Article is to describe tobacco control policies that
states and other governments have implemented, and to explore the impact
of these measures. The Article, therefore, provides a framework for what
is both possible and feasible for state governments to undertake in order to
reduce and minimize the impact of tobacco use in their state. Specifically,
this Article reviews and updates the findings from studies that explore the
relationship between tobacco control policies and population smoking
3 J. Michael

McGinnis & William H. Foege, Actual Causes ofDeath in the

United States, 270 JAMA 2207 (1993).
4 See Ctrs.

for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum.

Servs., State-SpecificPrevalenceofCurrentCigaretteSmokingAmongAdults and
the ProportionofAdults Who Work in a Smoke-FreeEnvironment-UnitedStates,
1999,49 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 978 (2000).
5See Dorothy P. Rice et al., The Economic Costs oflllness: A Replicationand
Update, 7 MILBANK Q. 61 (1985); Dorothy P. Rice et al., The Economic Costs of
the Health Effects of Smoking 1984, 64 MILBANK Q. 489 (1986).
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prevalence, health, and the economy as a whole. Data from Kentucky is
highlighted as an example of one state that is disproportionately affected
by tobacco use given its economic and cultural dependence on tobacco. The
Article begins with an overview of recent trends in tobacco use and its
consequences, followed by a review of the evidence for the effectiveness
of tobacco control policies. A description of the types and comprehensiveness of policies currently in place and a discussion of some of the factors
correlated with the strength and comprehensiveness of these policies
follows.
I.

TOBACCO USE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

The health implications of tobacco have been contemplated for at least
the past millennium. During the first half of that period, the predominant
view was that tobacco afforded users a wide variety of health benefits. The
American Indians employed tobacco as an analgesic and as a treatment for
such diverse ailments as intestinal problems, asthma, rheumatism,
headaches, toothaches, boils, worms, fevers, and the pains of childbirth.6
Serious medical and scientific attention to the health consequences of
smoking is a phenomenon of the present century, primarily of its second
half.7 This is a reflection of the development ofthe science ofepidemiology
during this period and of the relatively modest number of victims claimed
by tobacco prior to the twentieth century. Before this century, relatively

6 See JORDAN GOODMAN, TOBACCO IN HISTORY: THE CULTURES OF DEPEND-

ENCE (1993).
7 Concern about the health consequences of smoking predates the "modem era"
by nearly four centuries. In 1604, for example, King James I of England lambasted
smoking as "a custome lothsome to the eye, hatefull to the Nose, harmefull to the
braine, dangerous to the Lungs, and in the blacke stinking fume thereof, neerest
resembling the horrible Stigian smoke of the pit that is bottomlesse" (quoted in
JACOB SULLUM, FOR YOUR OWN GOOD: THE ANTI-SMOKING CRUSADE AND THE

TYRANNY OF PUBLIC HEALTH 18 (1998)). King James subsequently raised the tax
on tobacco by 1000%, deriving significant revenues for his coffers. This illustrates

the profound dilemma that has confronted policy decision makers ever since:
whatever its health consequences, tobacco has long been truly a "golden leaf' for
farmers and politicians alike. Its role in the very earliest commerce between
England and the American colonies is legendary, as is its role in contemporary
politics. See A.L. FRITsCHLER & J.M. HOEFLER, SMOKING AND POLITICS: POLICY
MAKING ANDTHEFEDERALBUREAUCRACY (5th ed. 1996);ReducingTobacco Use,
supra note 2; PETER TAYLOR, THE SMOKE RING: TOBACCO, MONEY, AND MULTINATIONAL POLtriCs (1984).
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few people reached the ages at which tobacco takes its greatest toll
(average life expectancy in the United States was forty-seven in 1900;
currently it is seventy-five). More importantly, widespread intensive use of
the most dangerous form of tobacco consumption, cigarette smoking, began
only in the very late 1800s. Lung cancer, today the source of thirty percent
of all cancer deaths in the United States,' was a rarity until cigarette
smoking spawned the epidemic first widely observed during the 1930s.
Although lung cancer incidence and death rates are decreasing nationwide
due to reduced smoking prevalence, the 1997-1998 age-adjusted incidence
rate for lung cancer in Kentucky was 81.6 per 100,000 population, 9
compared to an average annual rate of 54.4 in the United States.' There
were 82.8 deaths per 100,000 from respiratory and intrathoracic cancer in
12
1998,11 compared to an average annual rate of 49.1 in the United States.
Although a few scientific studies associated smoking with disease prior
to mid-century, 3 the first evidence that strongly implicated smoking in
disease (specifically, lung cancer) was published in the 1950s.' 4 Since then,
8 See

Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Ctr. for Chronic Disease Prevention & Health Promotion, Off. on Smoking & Health, U.S. Dep't of Health &
Hum. Servs., Reducing the Health Consequences of Smoking: 25 Years of
Progress:A Report of the Surgeon General (1989) [hereinafter Reducing the
Health Consequences ofSmoking].
9 G.H. Friedell & T.C. Tucker, University of Kentucky, Kentucky Cancer
Registry, 1998 CancerIncidenceReport (1998).
" Holly L. Howe et al., Annual Report to the Nation on the Status of Cancer
(1973 through 1998), FeaturingCancers with Recent Increasing Trends, 93 J.
NAT'L
CANCER INST. 824, 826 (2001).
. "Kentucky
Cabinet for Health Servs., Dep't for Public Health, Div. of
Epidemiology & Health Planning, Health Data Branch, 1998 VitalStatisticsReport
(1998).
'2Howe et al., supranote 10, at 828.
13 See A.C. Broders, Squamous-Cell Epithelioma of the Lip, 74 JAMA 656
(1920); H.L. Lombard & C.R. Doering, Classics in Oncology, CancerStudies in
Massachusetts, 198 NEw ENG. J. MED. 487 (1928); Raymond Pearl, Tobacco
Smoking andLongevity, 87 ScI. 216 (1938).
14 See Richard Doll & A. Bradford Hill, A Study ofthe Aetiology of Carcinoma
ofthe Lung, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 1271 (1952); Richard Doll & A. Bradford Hill, Lung
Cancerand Other Causes ofDeath in Relation to Smoking, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 1071
(1956); Richard Doll & A. Bradford Hill, Smoking and Carcinomaofthe Lung, 2
BRrr. MED. J. 739 (1950); Richard Doll & A. Bradford Hill, The Mortality of
Doctors in Relation to TheirSmokingHabits:A PreliminaryReport,1 BRIT. MED.
J. 1451 (1954); E. Cuyler Hammond & Daniel Horn, Smoking and Death RatesReport on Forty-FourMonths ofFollow-up of 187,783 Men: I TotalMortality,
166 JAMA 1159 (1958); E. CuylerHammond& Daniel Horn, Smoking andDeath
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nearly 70,000 scientific articles have implicated smoking in a wide variety
of ailments, constituting the largest and best documented literature linking
any behavior to disease in humans.15
Today, cigarette smoking is established as the leading cause of lung
cancer (responsible for approximatelyninetypercent of lung cancer deaths in
the United States), the leading cause of chronic bronchitis and emphysema
(responsible for over eighty percent ofchronic obstructive pulmonary disease
deaths), and a major cause ofheart disease and stroke. 6 Smoking also causes
aneurysms, atherosclerotic peripheral vascular disease, oral cavity and
laryngeal cancer, intrauterine growth retardation, and neonatal death,
including Sudden Infant Death Syndrome ("SIDS"). It also is associated with
additional cancers (bladder, pancreatic, renal, gastric, and cervical),17 as well
as a host of other conditions affecting a wide variety of organ systems and
disease processes, including, for example, vision and hearing problems,
slowed healing from injuries, and increased susceptibility to certain
infections."8 In addition, smoking amongpregnant women has been associated
with low birth weight and increased risk of infant mortality. 9 Chronic
inhalation of secondhand smoke causes lung cancer in nonsmokers and an
20
assortment ofdiseases and functional limitations in the children of smokers.

Rates-Report on Forty-FourMonths of Follow-up of 187,783 Men: II. Death
Rates by Cause, 166 JAMA 1294 (1958); Ernest L. Wynder & Evarts A. Graham,
Tobacco Smoking as aPossibleEtiologicFactorin BronchiogenicCarcinoma:A
Study ofSix Hundredand Eighty-FourProvedCases, 143 JAMA 329 (1950).
11 See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Nat'l Ctr. for Chronic Disease
Prevention & Health Promotion, Off. on Smoking & Health, U.S. Dep't of Health
& Hum. Servs., Preventing Tobacco Use Among Young People:A Report of the
Surgeon General (1994) [hereinafter Preventing Tobacco Use Among Young
People].
6 Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs.,
Annual Smoking-Attributable Mortality, Years of Potential Life Lost;, and
Economic Costs-UnitedStates, 1995-1999,51 MORBIDITY &MORTALITYWKLY.
REP. 300 (2002).
'"Reducing the Health Consequences of Smoking, supranote 8.
18 See AM. COUNCIL ON SCI. & HEALTH, CIGARETTES: WHAT THE WARNING
LABEL DOESN'T TELL YOU 117-28, 155-62 (2d ed. 1997).
'9 See James S. Marks et al., A Cost-Benefit/Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of
Smoking CessationforPregnantWomen, 6 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 282 (1990);
XiaobinWanget al.,MaternalCigaretteSmoking,MetabolicGenePolymorphism,
and Infant Birth Weight, 287 JAMA 195 (2002).
20Envtl. Protection Agency, Indoor Air Div., Off. of Radiation & Indoor Air,
The Costs andBenefits ofSmoking Restrictions:An Assessment ofthe Smoke-free
EnvironmentAct of1993 (H.R. 3434) (1994).
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Secondhand smoke also is associated with tens ofthousands of heart disease
deaths annually.2 1
All told, smoking is far and away the leading cause of premature death
and avoidable morbidity and disability in the United States and in most
industrialized nations, and the intensification of smoking in low and middle
income countries will soon bring the same distinction to smoking in
developing countries. The WHO estimates that 500 million of the five
billion people alive at the beginning of this decade will die as a result of
consumption of tobacco products.'
The mortality toll of tobacco reflects not only the lethal effect of
tobacco products, but also the prevalence of their consumption. In the
United States, approximately forty-five million adults, almost a quarter of
the adult population, smoke cigarettes (down from a high of forty-two
percent in 1965).23 Smoking prevalence and the corresponding health
effects of smoking vary substantially across the fifty states. Table 1
summarizes recent data on smoking prevalence across the United States,
showing population prevalence rates as low as 12.9% of adults in Utah, and
as high as 30.5% in Kentucky.24
TABLE 1.
ADULT SMOKING PREVALENCE IN THE U.S., 200025
STATE

PERCENT

Alabama
Alaska

(95% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL)
25.3 (+2.2)
25.0 (±2.8)

Arizona

18.6 (±3.1)

Arkansas

25.2(±1.8)

21See

Stanton A. Glantz & William W. Parmley, PassiveSmoking andHeart
Disease:Mechanisms andRisk, 273 JAMA 1047 (1995).
22 See Richard Peto et al., MortalityFrom Smoking Worldwide, 52 BRIT. MED.
BULL. 12,20 (1996).
2 Reducing the Health Consequencesof Smoking, supra note
24

8.

Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs.,

State-Specifc Prevalence of Current Cigarette Smoking Among Adults, and
Policies and Attitudes About Second Hand Smoke-United States, 2000, 50
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1101 (2001).
2 Id. Persons aged eighteen years or older who reported having smoked

cigarettes in their lifetime and who reported smoking every day or some days on
the 2000 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance Systems surveys ("BRFSS")
conducted by the Center for Disease Control.
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California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota

TOBACCO CONSUMPTIO

17.2 (±1.5)
20.1 (±2.0)
20.0 (±1.5)
23.0 (±2.1
20.9 (±2.2)
23.2 (±1.4)
23.6 (±1.7)
19.7 (±1.4)
22A (±1.4)
22.3 (±1.6)
27.0 (±1.8)
23.3 (±1.7)
21.1 (±1.4)
30.5 (±1.6)
24.1 (±1.4)
23.8 (±2.2)
20.6 (±1.5)
20.0 (±1.1)
24.2 (±1.9)
19.8 (±1.7)
23.5 (±2.2)
27.2 (±1.9)
18.9 (±1.8)
21.4 (±1.7)
29.1 (±2.8)
25A (±2.3)
21.0 (±1.5)
23.6 (±1.7)
21.6 (±1.6)
26.1 (±1.9)
23.3 (±2.1)
26.3 (±2.2)
23.3 (±1.6)
20.8 (±1.5)
24.3 (±1.6)
23.5 (±1.7)
24.7 (±1.9)
22.0 (±1.3)
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Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

[VOL. 90

25.7 (±1.8)
22.0 (±1.3)
12.9 (±1.6)
21.5 (±1.6)
21.5 (±2.1)
20.7 (±1.5)
26.1 (±1.9)
24.1 (±1.8)
23.8 (±1.9)

II.INTERVENTIONS TO REDUCE SMOKING

Variations in smoking prevalence across states reflect several factors,
including cultural and economic history, as well as investments in public
health strategies to reduce smoking. States generally draw upon three statebased sources to fund tobacco control: monies from the Master Settlement
Agreement ("MSA'), excise tax revenues, and general appropriations
funds. In addition, states receive funding from federal sources including the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Office on Smoking and Health,
as well as private foundations committed to tobacco control. Table 2 shows
that total resources devoted to tobacco control activities vary substantially
across states, ranging from $.10 cents per capita in Pennsylvania to $20.82
in Ohio. In Kentucky, total resources devoted to tobacco control activities
are less than $1 per capita.
TABLE 2.
PER CAPITA FUNDING OF TOBACCO
CONTROL ACTIVITIES BY STATE, 200126
STATE

AVERAGE TOTAL $/PERSON

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado

$ 0.53
$4.31
$7.32
$ 0.58
$ 3.44
$ 3.10

Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, STATE System, at http://www2.
cdc.gov/nccdphp/osb/state/epi_200 1/fundingactual.asp.
26
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Connecticut

$ 0.30

Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas

$4.61
$1.67
$2.81
$2.19
$ 8.75
$1.60
$2.35
$5.99
$3.52
$ 0.83
$0.90
$ 0.36
$15.08
$4.05
$10.22
$ 0.66
$ 4.71
$ 7.90
$ 0A3
$4.85
$4.83
$1.93
$ 3.29
$ 3.80
$1.89
$ 2.27
$0.32
$1.71
$ 20.82
$1.13
$2.71
$ 0.10
$ 3.03
$0.78
$4.09
$ 0.24
$0.59
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Utah
Vermont
Virginia

$0.67
$13.63
$1.98

Washington

$ 3.08

West Virginia

$ 4.28

Wisconsin

$4.37

Wyoming

$3.79

The primary goal of most tobacco control programs is to reduce overall
smoking prevalence. Reductions in population smoking prevalence can
come from two sources: the prevention of smoking initiation and increased
smoking cessation. Since ninety percent of smokers begin smoking as
adolescents, 27 prevention programs typically target children and adolescents. Cessation efforts, on the other hand, are mostly designed for adult
smokers, who have established smoking patterns. The vast majority of
tobacco-attributed deaths over the next fifty years will occur among current
adult smokers.2" Therefore, while prevention efforts are essential to
reducing smoking prevalence in the long term, comprehensive approaches
to promote smdking cessation are critical to near-term improvements in
public health. A mix of tobacco control policies that are effective only in
reducing smoking initiation would have little impact on smoking-attributable deaths during the first half of the twenty-first century. In contrast, a set
of policies that was effective in significantly reducing tobacco use in all
segments of the population (current and never-smokers) would generate
substantial reductions in the public health toll caused by tobacco.
Beyond the public health burden caused by tobacco use, governments
at the local, state, and federal levels have important economic reasons for
implementing tobacco control policies that aim to prevent smoking
initiation and/or stimulate smoking cessation. For example, economic
justification for government intervention occurs when consumers possess
inadequate information to make efficient choices. 29 Even after several
decades of public health warnings, many consumers have inadequate
information about the health consequences of tobacco use and a poor
27

PreventingTobacco Use Among Young People,supra note 15.

21See

R. Peto & A.D. Lopez, The Future WorldwideHealth Effects ofCurrent

Smoking Patterns,in CRrrIcAL IssuEs INGLOBAL HEALTH 154 (C.E. Koop et al.

eds., 2001).
29 See H. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYsIs (2d ed. 1984);
K.E. Warner et
al., Criteria for Determining an Optimal Cigarette Tax: The Economist's
Perspective, 4 TOBACCO CONTROL 380 (1995).

TOBACCO CoNsuMPrIoN

2001-2002]

1019

understanding of the addictive nature of tobacco products. While general
awareness of many of the health risks attributable to smoking is relatively
high in the United States,30 many smokers still underestimate tobacco's
danger relative to other health risks, and many smokers fail to fully
internalize these risks.3 ' Most importantly, the addictive nature of tobacco
is under-appreciated, particularly among adolescents. For example, in a
study of adolescent smokers in the U.S., only five percent believed that they
would still be smoking five years later, but over seventy-five percent were
still smoking eight years later. 2
The remaining sections of this Article summarize key areas of tobacco
control policy and the evidence of how these strategies affect smoking
behavior across the population and among individual demographic groups.
III. TAXATION AS A POLICY
LEVER TO REDUCE TOBACCO CONSUMPTION

Nearly all governments tax tobacco products. Some of these taxes are
specific excise, or per unit, taxes; others are expressed as a percentage of
wholesale or retail prices (ad valorem excise taxes). Historically, these
taxes have primarily been used to generate revenues. In recent years,
however, a growing number of governments have increased tobacco taxes
to promote public health, earmarking some of the new revenues generated
from the higher taxes for comprehensive programs to reduce tobacco use
and/or implement other health-related programs.
A. Descriptionof the Different Tax Approaches By States

There are significant differences across states in the level of tobacco
taxes. The average state excise tax on cigarettes in the United States in
2001 was $0.42/pack. However, as illustrated by Table 3, there is a
substantial range among the states. The tobacco-growing states tend to have
the lowest excise taxes: North Carolina, at $0.05/pack; Kentucky at
$0.03/pack; and Virginia at $0.025/pack of cigarettes. In contrast, state
30

See W. Kip Viscusi, Do Smokers Underestimate Risks?, 98 J. POL. ECON.

12533 (1990).

1See John Z. Ayanian

& Paul D. Cleary, PerceivedRisksofHeartDisease and
CancerAmong Cigarette Smokers, 281 JAMA 1019 (1999); Neil D. Weinstein,
Accuracy ofSmokers' Risk Perceptions,20 ANNALS BEHAV. MED. 135 (1998).
32 Steve Sussman et al., Self-initiatedQuittingAmongAdolescent Smokers, 27
PREVENTIVE MED. A19 (1998).
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excise taxes in New York are $1.1 l/pack, those in Alaska and Hawaii are
as high as $1.00/pack, followed by California at $0.87/pack.33 Increases in
late 2001 and early 2002 have taken taxes even higher in some states, with
New York's tax scheduled to rise to $1.50/pack in April 2002, while voters
in Washington state recently overwhelmingly approved an increase to
$1.425/pack.
Typically, states apply an ad valoremtax to sales of smokeless tobacco.
However, there is substantial variation in both the level of the tax and the
type of sale against which the ad valorem tax is applied. Because of the
differences in how the tax is charged across states, it is more difficult to
directly compare states' taxation of smokeless tobacco. Nonetheless, Table
3 shows that the pattern of taxation of smokeless tobacco is similar to that
of cigarettes, with tobacco producing states implementing the lowest taxes
on smokeless tobacco. Kentucky does not tax smokeless tobacco, cigars, or
loose leaf tobacco at all.
TABLE 3.
EXCISE TAXES FOR CIGARETTES
AND SMOKELESS TOBACCO BY STATE, 200 134
STATE

CENTS PER PACK OF

SMOKELESS TOBACCO

CIGARETTES

(PERCENTAGE OF)

Alabama

16.5

Alaska

100.0

NA

75.0
(Wholesale price)

Arizona

58.0

Arkansas

31.5

NA
23.0
(Manufacturer's sales price)

California

87.0

61.5
(Wholesale sales price)

Colorado

20.0

Connecticut

50.0

20.0
(Manufacturer's list price)
20.0
(Wholesale sales price)

Delaware

24.0

District of Columbia

65.0

15.0
(Wholesale sales price)
NA

33 Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, STATE System, at http://www2.
cdc.gov/nccdphp/osh/state/epL2001.
34
Id.
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Florida

33.9

Georgia
Hawaii

12.0
100.0

Idaho

28.0

Illinois

58.0

Indiana

15.5

Iowa

36.0

Kansas

24.0

Kentucky
Louisiana

3.0
24.0

Maine

74.0

25.0
(Wholesale sales price)
NA
40.0
(Wholesale sales price)

40.0
(Wholesale sales price)
20.0
(Wholesale sales price)
15.0
(Wholesale sales price)
22.0
(Wholesale sales price)
10.0
(Wholesale sales price)

NA
20.0
(Manufacturer's invoice price)
62.0
(Wholesale sales price)

Maryland

66.0

Massachusetts

76.0

15.0
(Wholesale sales price)
50.0
(Wholesale sales price)

Michigan

75.0

16.0
(Wholesale sales price)

Minnesota

48.0

35.0
(Wholesale sales price)

Mississippi

18.0

15.0
(Manufacturer's list price)

Missouri

17.0

10.0
(Manufacturer's invoice price)

Montana

18.0

Nebraska

34.0

Nevada

35.0

12.5
(Wholesale sales price)
15.0
(Purchase price)

30.0
(Wholesale price)

New Hampshire

52.0

21.6
(Wholesale sales price)

New Jersey

80.0

48.0
(Wholesale price)
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New Mexico

21.0

New York

111.0

25.0
(Product value)
20.0
(Wholesale sales price)
2.0

North Carolina

5.0

North Dakota

44.0

28.0
(Wholesale purchase price)

Ohio
Oklahoma

24.0
23.0

Oregon

68.0

Pennsylvania
Rhode Island

31.0
71.0

South Carolina

7.0

South Dakota

33.0

Tennessee

13.0

Texas

41.0

Utah

51.5

Vermont

44.0

Virginia
Washington

2.5
82.5

NA
30.0
(Factory list price)
35.0
(Wholesale sales price)
NA
20.0
(Wholesale sales price)
5.0
(Manufacturer's list price)
10.0
(Wholesale purchase price)
6.0
(Wholesale sales price)
35.0
(Manufacturer's list price)
35.0
(Manufacturer's sales price)
41.0
(Wholesale price)
NA
75.0
(Wholesale sales price)

West Virginia

17.0

NA

Wisconsin

59.0

Wyoming

12.0

20.0
(Manufacturer's list price)
20.0
(Wholesale purchase price)

(Cost)

I

B. RelationshipBetween Smoking and Cigarette Taxes
The variations in cigarette excise taxes have important public health

implications. Well over one hundred studies from high-income countries
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clearly demonstrate that increases in cigarette and other tobacco product
taxes lead to significant reductions in cigarette smoking and other tobacco
use. These studies confirm the most fundamental law of economics: as the
price of a product increases, the demand for that product falls. The
reductions in tobacco use that result from higher taxes and prices reflect the
combination of increased smoking cessation, reduced relapse, lower
smoking initiation, and decreased consumption among continuing tobacco
users.
Economists use the term "price elasticity" of demand to reflect the
impact of price changes on consumption, where the elasticity is defined
as the percentage change in the quantity consumed resulting from a one
percent increase in price. Studies from the United States, United Kingdom
(UK), Canada, and many other high-income countries generally estimate that the overall price elasticity of cigarette demand ranges from -0.25
to -.50;" an expert panel convened by the National Cancer Institute arrived
at a consensus estimate of the adult overall price elasticity of demand for
cigarettes of -0.40,36 meaning that for every ten percent increase in the real
price of cigarettes, demand is expected to drop by four percent.
Overall price elasticity of demand for cigarettes consists of two
components: participation elasticity-the extent to which price influences
whether or not people smoke; and conditional demand elasticity--the
amount of cigarettes consumed by those who smoke. Most studies attribute
approximately half of the change in overall demand to changes in smoking
participation (increased quitting and reduced initiation) and half to reduced
consumption among the remaining smokers. 7
C. Variationsin the Effect of Tobacco Excise Taxes Across Age Groups
Many studies have used individual-level data to explore differences in
the price elasticity of cigarette demand by age, with a particular emphasis
on youth and young adults. Using data from the Health Examination Survey
35 Frank J. Chaloupka

et al., The Taxation of Tobacco Products, in TOBACCO
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 237-72 (Prabhot Jha & Frank Chaloupka
eds.,362000) [hereinafter Chaloupka et al., The Taxation of Tobacco Products].
Nat'l Cancer Inst., Div. of Cancer Prevention & Control, Cancer Control Sci.
Program, The Impact of CigaretteExcise Taxes on Smoking Among Children and
Adults:
Summary Report of a NationalCancerInstitute ExpertPanel (1993).
37
CONTROL

G.S.

BECKER ET AL., AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF CIGARETTE ADDICTION

(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, 1990); Eugene M. Lewit et al., Price, Public
Policy,andSmoking in Young People,6 TOBACCO CONTROL S 17 (Supp. 2 1997).
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III ("HES I) conducted between 1966 and 1970, Lewit, Coate, and
Grossman estimated that the price elasticity of adolescent demand for
cigarettes was -1.44, more than three times as high as the adult elasticity
estimates.38 Importantly, Lewit et al., also found that the strongest impact
of price is on adolescent smoking participation, which represents one of
two components of the overall elasticity estimate; their estimate of the
elasticity of participation accounted for over eighty percent of their overall
adolescent price elasticity estimate.
Chaloupka and Grossman used data on teen smoking gathered in 1992,
1993, and 1994 as part of the Monitoringthe Futureproject. 9 Their study
confirmed the results of Lewit et al., estimating the average overall
adolescent price elasticity of demand for cigarettes at -1.313, and the
elasticity of smoking participation as -0.68.4" Thus, overall adolescent

elasticity is two to three times higher than adult elasticity, and the elasticity
of smoking participation accounts for over half of the overall estimate by
their calculations. Based on these and several additional studies, it is
generally well-accepted that there is an inverse relationship between price
elasticity and age.41
More recently, researchers have begun to explore the differential
impact of cigarette prices on the process of youth smoking uptake. Gruber
and Zinman found that while younger adolescents (who typically are more
likely to be experimenters than established smokers) were not significantly
influenced by cigarette prices, older youth (twelfth graders) were highly
sensitive to cigarette prices, smoking less where excise taxes are higher.42
Similarly, Emery and her colleagues showed that while higher cigarette
prices did not influence whether or not a youth experiments with smoking,
prices were significantly related to reduced consumption among regular
38 Eugene M. Lewit et al.,

The Effects of Government Regulationson Teenage
Smoking, 24 J.L. & ECON. 545, 549-50, 560 (1981).
39 FRANK J. CHALOUPKA ET AL., TOBACCO CONTROL POLICIES AND YOUTH
SMOKING (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
TOBACCO CONTROL POLICIES].
40

Id.

4!

See, e.g.,

J. GRUBER,

1996) [hereinafter CHALOUPKA ETAL.,

YOUTH SMOKING INTHE U.S.: PRICES AND POLICIES

(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper, 2000); PreventingTobacco Use
Among Young People, supra note 15; Reducing the Health Consequences of
Smoking, supranote 8; Jeffrey E. Harris & Sandra W. Chan, The Continuum-ofAddiction: CigaretteSmoking in Relation to PriceAmongAmericansAged15-29,
8 HEALTH ECON. 81, 82 (1998).
42
J. GRUBER &J. ZINMAN, YOUTH SMOKING INTHE U.S.: EVIDENCE AND IMPLICATIONS

(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper, 2000).
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smokers and a reduced likelihood of being an established smoker in
adolescence.4 3
These results suggest that higher cigarette prices are particularly
effective in preventing young smokers from moving beyond experimentation into regular, addicted smoking. In addition, these results make sense
in the context of the natural history of smoking. In the very early stages of
smoking uptake, adolescents typically obtain their cigarettes from friends,
rather than paying for them; as they transition to more regular smoking,
44
they begin buying the cigarettes that they consume.
D. Variationsin ElasticityAcross Income and Race/Ethnicity
Similarly, several studies have explored differences in the price
sensitivity ofcigarette demand by income, education, and/or socioeconomic
status. 41 Economic theory predicts that individuals with lower incomes
and/or less education will be more responsive to price. The studies
demonstrate how less educated persons,46 lower income individuals,4 7 and
people in lower socioeconomic classes4' show greater reductions in
smoking in response to price increases compared to the general population
of smokers.
43 Sherry Emery et al.,

Does CigarettePricenfluenceAdolescentExperimentation?, 20 J.HEALTH ECON. 261,268 (2001).
4See Sherry Emery et al., HowAdolescents Get Their Cigarettes:Implications
for Policieson Access and Price,91 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 184 (1999).
45 See Reducing Tobacco Use, supra note 2; Ctrs. for Disease Control &
Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., Responses to Increases in
Cigarette Prices By Race/Ethnicity, Income, and Age Groups-UnitedStates,
1976-1993, 47 MoRBiDrrY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 605 (1998) [hereinafter
Responses to Increases];Frank J. Chaloupka & K.E. Warner, The Economics of
Smoking, in HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 1539-627 (A.J. Culyer & J.P.
Newhouse eds., 2000); Chaloupka et al., The Taxation ofTobaccoProducts,supra
note 35, at 237; Joy Townsend et al., CigaretteSmokingBy Socioeconomic Group,
Sex, and Age: Effects ofPrice,Income, and Health Publicity, 309 BRrr. MED. J.
923 (1994) [hereinafter Townsend et al., Cigarette Smoking By Socioeconomic
Group].
"SeeFrankJ. Chaloupka, RationalAddictiveBehaviorandCigaretteSmoking,
99J. POL. ECoN. 722(1991) [hereinafter Chaloupka, RationalAddictiveBehavior].
' See Responses to Increases,supra note 45, at 606.
4"See Townsend et al., CigaretteSmokingBy Socioeconomic Group,supranote
45; Joy Townsend, CigaretteTax, Economic Welfare andSocialClass Patternsof
Smoking, 19 APPLIED ECoN. 355 (1987).
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E. Effect ofAddiction on Economic Analyses
Many researchers once viewed cigarette smoking and other addictive
behaviors as irrational and, therefore, not suitable for conventional
economic analysis. 4 9 They believed that the demand for cigarettes (and
other addictive substances) did not follow the basic laws of economics,
including perhaps the most fundamental law, embodied in the downwardsloping demand curve. As the now-substantial body of economic research
demonstrates, however, the demand for cigarettes clearly responds to
changes in prices and other factors, as found in applications of both
traditional models of demand and more recent
studies that explicitly
50
account for the addictive nature of smoking.
Several researchers have modeled addiction as a rational behavior. In
this context, rationality simply implies that individuals incorporate the
interdependence between past, current, and future consumption into their
utility maximization process. Becker and Murphy et al., developed several
hypotheses from this basic mode.51 First, current consumption of an
addictive good is inversely related to not only the current price of the good,
but also to all past and future prices. In other words, these theories suggest
that the more a smoker consumed in past periods, the more they will
consume in the present; additionally, if a smoker anticipates reduced
consumption in the future (perhaps due to expected cigarette price
increases), their consumption in the present will be reduced. Consequently,
the long-run effect of a permanent change in price will exceed the short-run
effect. Moreover, in the Becker and Murphy model, the ratio of the longrun to short-run price effect rises as the degree of addiction rises. In
addition, they predict that the effect of an anticipated price change will be
greater than the impact of a comparable unanticipated price change, while
a permanent price change will have a larger impact on demand than a
temporary price change. Finally, the theory of rational addiction suggests
that price responsiveness varies with time preference: addicts with higher
discount rates (less orientation to the future) will be relatively more
responsive to changes in price than those with lower discount rates. The
49

See JON ELSTER,

ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND

157-61 (1979); Thomas C.Schelling, Self-Command in Practice,
in Policy, and in a Theory ofRational Choice,74 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1984); G.C.
Winston, Addiction andBacksliding:A Theory of Compulsive Consumption, 1 J.
ECON. BEHAV. & ORGAN. 295 (1980).
50See BECKER ET AL., supranote 37; Chaloupka,
RationalAddictiveBehavior,
supranote 46.
5!See BECKER ET AL., supranote 37; Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, A
Theory of RationalAddiction,96 J. POL. ECoN. 675 (1988).
IRRATIONALITY
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opposite will be true with respect to the effects of information concerning
the future consequences of addictive consumption. Thus, the model
suggests that younger, less educated, and lower income persons will be
relatively more responsive to changes in the price of cigarettes, while older,
more educated, and higher income persons will be relatively more
responsive to new information on the health consequences of cigarette
a,-nlnlicr "ThpPmnlri,-nI nnnlinntinm nf fteQn thenrie-, aeneraliv

eq tirnate

1028

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 90

enacted legislation restricting smoking in a variety of public places and
private worksites. Arizona led the way among states, enacting the first "clean
indoor air" laws in 1973, with the explicit objective of limiting nonsmokers'
exposure to secondhand smoke.' In 1998, California enacted the most
comprehensive smoking restrictions in the country, completely banning
smoking in all places of employment, including bars and restaurants.
Although many states and local communities have adopted strict workplace
smoking restrictions, the tobacco-growing states lag behind in protecting
workers from the dangers of secondhand smoke.55 Kentucky has no statemandated smoking restrictions inpublic places, workplaces, restaurants, child
care centers, or health facilities.56 State law favors allowing smoking in
government buildings where ventilation and air exchange are adequate.
Although Kentucky does not preempt local governments from adopting clean
indoor air laws, there are no existing smoke-free local ordinances or
regulations.
In general, state and local laws can prohibit smoking in elevators, health
care facilities, public transportation, indoor cultural andrecreational facilities,
government buildings, public meeting rooms, schools, shopping malls, and
retail stores. As in California, the most extensive laws also include restaurants
and private workplaces. In addition to formal policies restricting smoking,
increased awareness among the general population of the consequences of
secondhand smoke exposure, particularly among children, has led many
workplaces and households to adopt voluntary restrictions on smoking.
In a state with very weak or nonexistent state laws restricting smoking,
it is surprising that over half (fifty-six percent) of indoor workers in
Kentucky reported that their worksites were smoke-free,57 reflecting
voluntarypolicy change. While nearly seven often manufacturing facilities
in Kentucky reported having smoking policies, only forty-three percent

[hereinafter The Health Consequencesoflnvoluntary Smoking]; Envtl. Protection
Agency, Off. of Research & Dev., Off. of Air & Radiation, RespiratoryHealth
Effects of Passive Smoking: Lung Cancer and Other Disorders (1992); Kyle
Steenland, PassiveSmokingandtheRiskofHeartDisease,267 JAMA 94 (1992);
Kyle Steenland et al., EnvironmentalTobaccoSmoke andCoronaryHeartDisease
in the American CancerSociety CPS-I Cohort,94 CIRCULATION 622 (1996).
54 The Health ConsequencesofInvoluntarySmoking, supra note 53.
55
E.M. SCHILLINGS & C.E. WELCH, STATE LEGISLATED ACTIONS ON TOBACCO

ISSUES (Am. Lung Ass'n 2001).
56 -d.

5'Donald R. Shopland et al., State-Specific Trends in Smoke-Free Workplace
Policy Coverage: The CurrentPopulationSurvey Tobacco Use Supplement, 1993
to 1999, 42 J. OCCUPATIONAL &ENVTL. MED. 680, 682 (2001).
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banned indoor smoking.5" A similar percentage of food service establishments (thirty-nine percent) were smoke-free in 2001, reflecting a twenty
percent increase since 1999.' 9 Although nearly all Kentucky public and
private middle and high schools reported banning indoor smoking in 2001,

only forty-five percent completely banned smoking on school grounds.6"
Given the paucity of laws or regulations on smoking in Kentucky, it is not
surprising that almost two-thirds of middle school nonsmokers and nearly
three-fourths of high school nonsmokers report exposure to secondhand
smoke within the past seven days.6
A number of recent econometric and other studies have examined the
impact of smoking restrictions on cigarette demand in the United States and
elsewhere.62 In general, restrictions on smoking in public places and private

11 Ellen J. Hahn & M.K. Rayens, University of Kentucky, Dep't for Public
Health, Tobacco Preventionand Cessation:A Kentucky Report Card,1997-2001
(2002).
59 Id.
60

Id.

Ellen J. Hahn et al., Kentucky Dep't for Public Health, Kentucky Youth
Tobacco
Survey 2000 (2001).
62 See
FRANK J. CHALOUPKA & ROSALIE L. PACULA, AN EXAMINATION OF
61

GENDER AND RACE DIFFERENCES INSMOKING: RESPONSIVENESS TO PRICE AND

TOBACCO CONTROL POLICIES (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper,
1998); FRANK J. CHALOUPKA & ROSALIE L. PACULA, LIMffING YOUTH ACCESS TO
TOBACCO: THE EARLY IMPACT OF THE SYNAR AMENDMENT ON YOUTH SMOKING
(Univ. of Ill. Working Paper, 1998) [hereinafter CHALOUPKA &PACULA, LIMITING
YOUTH ACCESS TO TOBACCO]; W.N. EVANS ET AL., Do WORKPLACE SMOKING
BANS REDUCE SMOKING? (Nat'l Bureau ofEcon. Research, Working Paper, 1995);
R.L. OHSFELDT ET AL., TOBACCO TAXES, SMOKING RESTRICTIONS, AND TOBACCO

USE (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper, 1998); Frank J. Chaloupka,
CleanIndoorAirLaws, Addiction andCigaretteSmoking, 24APPLIED ECON. 193
(1992); CHALOUPKA ETAL., TOBACCO CONTROL POLICIES, supranote 39; Frank J.

Chaloupka & Henry Saffer, Clean Indoor Air Laws and the Demand for
Cigarettes,64 CONTEMP. POL'Y ISSUES 72 (1992); Frank J. Chaloupka & Henry
Wechsler, Price,Tobacco ControlPoliciesand SmokingAmong YoungAdults, 16
J. HEALTH ECON. 359 (1997); Theodore E. Keeler et al., Taxation, Regulationand
Addiction: A DemandFunctionforCigarettesBased on Time-SeriesEvidence, 12
J. HEALTH ECON. 1(1993); J.L. Townsend, UKSmoking Targets:PoliciestoAttain
Them and Effects on PrematureMortality [hereinafter Townsend, UK Smoking
Targets], in I. ABEDIAN ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF TOBACCO CONTROL: TOWARD
AN OPTIMAL POLICY MIX (1998); J. Wasserman et al., The Effects ofExcise Taxes
and Regulations on CigaretteSmoking, 10 J. HEALTH ECON. 43 (1991).
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workplaces have been found to reduce both smoking prevalence and
average daily cigarette consumption among smokers.
Among studies by non-economists, Farkas and his colleagues found
that both workplace and household smoking restrictions were associated
with higher rates of cessation attempts among adult smokers, lower rates
of relapse in adult smokers who attempted to quit, and higher rates of light
smoking (less than fifteen cigarettes per day) among current daily
smokers.63 Farkas and his colleagues also found that youth who worked in
smokefree establishments were significantly less likely to smoke than
adolescents who worked in places without a smoking ban.' They also
found that adolescents who lived in a home that completely banned
smoking were significantly less likely to be smokers, and were significantly
more likely to have successfully quit if they had ever begun smoking.
Research by economists and non-economists alike point to a powerful
role for strong smoking restrictions in both reducing the amount that
current smokers smoke, as well as in potentially improving cessation rates,
and reducing smoking prevalence among both youth and adults. Although
smoking restrictions are primarily intended to reduce nonsmokers'
exposure to secondhand smoke, research suggests that they also can lead
to significant reductions in cigarette smoking since they reduce the
smoker's opportunities to smoke or otherwise raise the "cost" of smoking.
In addition, restrictions on smoking may alter the perceived norms related
to smoking by changing attitudes concerning the social acceptability of
smoking.65 It is etimated that 178,000 smokers would stop smoking and
those who continued to smoke would consume ten billion fewer cigarettes
per year if all workplaces in the United States implemented smoke-free
policies.'
B. Effect ofRestrictions on Smoking to Youth Access

In the United States, laws banning the sale of cigarettes to minors have
been in place in forty-six states and the District of Columbia for over a
6 3See Arthur I

Farkas et al., The Effects ofHouseholdand Workplace Smoking
Restrictions on QuittingBehaviors, 8 TOBACCO CONTROL 261 (Autumn 1999).
64 See Arthur . Farkas et al., Association Between Householdand Workplace
Smoking Restrictions andAdolescent Smoking, 284 JAMA 717 (2000).
6 5See generallyPreventingTobacco Use Among YoungPeople,
supranote 15.
6RE. Glasgow et al., Relationshipof Worksite Smoking Policy to Changesin
Employee Tobacco Use: Findingsfrom COMMIT, 6 TOBACCo CONTROL S44

(Supp. 2 1997).
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decade. Additionally, many municipalities require a license to sell tobacco
products; the threat of license revocation is a potentially effective
enforcement mechanism. Nationally, the United States Congress passed
legislation in 1992, commonly referred to as the Synar Amendment,67
which ties Federal block grant monies to states' active and effective
enforcement of a law prohibiting the sale of tobacco to anyone under the
age of eighteen. The strongest federal action came in 1996, when the Food
and Drug Administration ("FDA") established eighteen as the national
minimum age at which tobacco products could be sold, preempting state
and local laws. In Kentucky, tobacco retailers are not licensed to sell
tobacco products, making enforcement of state youth access laws difficult.
Although it is illegal both to sell tobacco products to anyone under eighteen
years of age and for teenagers to possess or use tobacco in Kentucky, only
about one-third of smokers in grades six through twelve reported they were
.refused purchase of cigarettes due to their age in the past thirty days.6 s
The literature provides mixed evidence on the effectiveness of these
youth access limits. A few studies have found that raising retailer compliance with the minimum age laws reduces the prevalence of youth
smoking.69 Others, however, have found little impact on youth smoking,
even with high compliance by retailers. 0 Moreover, research suggests that
there would be no noticeable effect on adolescent cigarette purchases until
store compliance was high enough that illegal sales of cigarettes to minors
occurred in only about ten percent of random checks.7 Even if very high
rates ofmerchant compliance were achieved, adolescent smokers might rely
to a greater extent on older friends to buy or give them cigarettes. In
Kentucky, about half of middle and high school smokers obtain cigarettes
from social sources by either borrowing cigarettes or giving someone else
money to get cigarettes.72 Moreover, middle school smokers are less likely
than high school smokers to buy cigarettes in a store.73
67 Alcohol, Drug Abuse, &Mental

Health Administration Reorganization Act,

Pub.6 8L. No. 102-321, § 1926 (1992).
Hahn et al., supra note 61.
69See Jean L. Forster
et al., The Effects ofCommunity Policiesto Reduce Youth
Access to Tobacco, 88 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1193, 1197 (1998).
71 Nancy A. Rigotti et al., The Effect of Enforcing Tobacco Sales Laws on
Adolescents' Access to Tobacco and Smoking Behavior, 337 NEw ENG. J. MED.

1044 (1997).
71 JR. DiFranza et al., Reducing Youth Access to Tobacco, 1 TOBACCO
CONTROL 58 (1992).
72 Hahn et al., supra note 61.
73Id.
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Glantz has argued that tobacco control emphasis on access laws may
actually contribute to adolescent smoking by shifting attention away from
the tobacco industry and toward the supply chain, namely the tens of
thousands of small stores from which many adolescents buy their cigarettes. Glantz has also suggested that these laws convey the message that
smoking is an adult habit or custom and, thereby, make smoking appear
attractive to adolescents who strive to look and act like adults.74
A few recent econometric analyses have examined the impact of these
limits on youth tobacco use in the United States, generally finding little or
no impact on youth cigarette smoking and other tobacco use.75 Chaloupka
and Grossman attributed this to the relatively weak enforcement of these
laws.76 Chaloupka and Pacula 7" examined the impact of enforcement and
compliance with the limits on youth access on youth smoking using data
collected in a special 1994 survey of state activities related to the Synar
Amendment.78 Chaloupka and Pacula's estimates suggest that when the
limits on youth access are comprehensively and aggressively enforced, they
significantly reduce the prevalence of youth smoking.
Certainly, the mixed evidence about youth access laws should not be
construed to imply that such laws should be repealed, since this would send
a message that adolescent smoking is condoned. Nor does the research
suggest that access laws are wholly ineffective. Clearly more research is
necessary to determine whether these measures can delay addiction by
encouraging adolescents to remain experimenters rather than becoming
regular smokers. Research has shown that delayed daily smoking is
associated with lower levels of cigarette consumption among adults.79
Additionally, lower consumption has been shown to contribute to eventual

74 See Stanton A. Glantz, PreventingTobacco Use-The Youth Access Trap,86
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 156 (1996).
75

See CHALOUPKA & PACULA, LIMITING YOUTH ACCESS TO TOBACCO, supra

note 62; CHALOUPKA ET AL., TOBACCO CONTROL

POLICIES,

supra note 39;

Wasserman et al., supra note 62.
76
77

62. 7

See CHALOUPKA ET AL., TOBACCO CONTROL POLICIES, supra note 39.
CHALoUPKA & PACULA, LIMITING YOUTH ACCESS TO TOBACCO, supra note

L.A. Downey & J.A. Gardner, Off. of Soc. Sci. Res., Univ. oflU. at Chicago,
Reducing
Youth Access to Tobacco: A PartialInventory ofStateInitiatives(1996).
7
9 See Naomi Breslau, Daily CigaretteConsumption in EarlyAdulthood: Age
of Smoking Initiation and Durationof Smoking, 33 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 287 (1993); Naomi Breslau et al., Early Smoking Initiation and Nicotine
Dependencein a CohortofYoungAdults, 33 DRUG & ALCOHbL DEPENDENCE 129
(1993).
1
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success in quitting."0 Therefore, youth access laws may accomplish goals
that are consistent with the public health agenda, but are different than their
explicit intent.
V. BAN ON ADVERTISING AND PROMOTION
AS A POLICY LEVER TO REDUCE TOBACCO CONSUMPTION

Tobacco advertising is nearly ubiquitous in the United States, and
cigarettes are the most widely advertised product in the world. Until 1999,
when the MSA banned most forms of outdoor cigarette advertising in the
United States, it was nearly impossible to drive on the freeway or sit at a
bus stop without seeing an advertisement for cigarettes. In most magazines
and newspapers, cigarette ads account for a large portion of the advertising
pages, and one must pass through a door with a cigarette logo to enter
nearly any grocery or convenience store. Moreover, a variety of sporting
and cultural events bear the sponsorship of cigarette brands. To achieve this
level of advertising penetration, tobacco companies spent $8.4 billion on
advertising and promotion in the United States, the highest spending level
reported to date.81 As a percentage of sales, these expenditures have
increased dramatically since 1980. Despite the advertising restrictions of
the MSA between state Attorneys General and the tobacco companies,
tobacco companies continue to target Kentucky's children, as evidenced by
the fact that both middle and high school smokers smoke Marlboro, the
most heavily advertised brand.'
Tobacco advertising activities include the placement of ads in
traditional advertising venues such as billboards, in magazines and
newspapers, and the Internet. However, in recent years, the tobacco
industry has begun to substantially shift its advertising and promotional
expenditures toward spending on promotional activities such as allowances
to retailers, point-of-purchase promotional materials, direct mail advertising, the distribution of free samples, coupons, and specialty items, multiple
pack promotions, and retail value-added offers, as well as endorsements,
sponsorship of cultural, sporting, and other entertainment events, and
sponsorship of community and other organizations. While nearly ninety
8'See generally John P. Pierce et al., Beyond Stages of Change: The Quitting
Continuum Measures Progress Toward Successful Smoking Cessation, 93
ADDICTION
277 (1998).
81

Fed. Trade Comm'n, CigaretteReportfor1999 (2001) [hereinafter Cigarette

Report].
82

Wasserman et al., supra note 62.
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percent of all cigarette advertising and promotional expenditures in the
United States in 1974 were devoted to traditional advertising, by 1999, in
striking contrast, this had fallen to under ten percent, with the balance
going to the less-traditional promotional activities.83 Promotional allowances ($3.5 billion in 1999) and coupons and retail value added ($2.6
billion in 1999) have been the largest spending categories in recent years."
The impact of cigarette advertising on cigarette smoking, particularly
youth smoking, has been the subject of extensive debate over the past
several decades. The public health community generally believes that
advertising encourages smoking and is an important influence on smoking
initiation among youth. The industry, on the other hand, contends that
cigarette advertising is a form of competition that has no impact on overall
cigarette smoking, but instead simply affects market share. In addition, the
industry argues that advertising provides useful information to smokers
about their products, including information on tar and nicotine content.
Warner has suggested several mechanisms through which cigarette
advertising and promotion could affect cigarette consumption. 5 He
identified four direct mechanisms: (1) advertising can entice children and
young adults to experiment with smoking and to initiate regular smoking;
(2) it can reduce current smokers' (adults and adolescents) willingness to
quit smoking; (3) it can serve as a cue or stimulus that leads to increased
daily cigarette consumption by smokers; and (4) it can induce former
smokers to resume tobacco use by reinforcing the attractions of smoking.86
Warner also noted two indirect mechanisms: (1) discouraging a full
discussion of the health consequences of cigarette smoking in the media
that is dependent on tobacco advertising; and (2) contributing to a social
environment in which smoking is perceived to be socially acceptable.87 The
United States Surgeon General added a third indirect mechanism, namely
that institutions dependent on tobacco industry promotional and other
support may create political opposition to strong tobacco control policies. 88
Warner and his colleagues have examined the first indirect mechanism
empirically, concluding that there is strong evidence that magazines'
coverage of the hazards of smoking was significantly diminished as the

83

CigaretteReport, supranote 81.

4Id.
85 KENNETH E. WARNER, SELLING SMOKE: CIGARETTE ADVERTISING AND

PUBLIC
HEALTH 59-60 (1986).
8
6Id.

87 Id.
88

Reducing the Health Consequences of Smoking, supra note 8.
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magazines' share of advertising revenues from cigarette advertising rose. 9
They found that magazines that did not carry cigarette advertising were
more than forty percent more likely to cover the health consequences of
smoking than those with cigarette advertising." The difference was even
more pronounced in women's magazines, with those that did not advertise cigarettes more than 230% more likely to cover the hazards of
91
smoking.
Numerous econometric studies, mostly from the United States and the
UK, have explored the relationship between cigarette advertising and
promotional expenditures and cigarette demand. In general, these studies
have produced mixed findings, with most studies concluding that advertising has, at most, a small positive impact on demand. However, critics of
these studies note that econometric methods, which estimate the impact of
a marginal change in advertising expenditures on smoking, are ill-suited for
studying the impact of advertising. 2
In their seminal work, Lewit and his colleagues used data on about
6700 youth, ages twelve to seventeen years, taken from Cycle I of the
U.S. Health Examination Survey conducted from 1966 through 1970.13
Based on measures of televised cigarette advertising and counter-advertising, and self-reported information on time spent watching television, Lewit
and his colleagues estimated the number of pro- and anti-smoking
commercials each youth would have seen.94 Their estimates provide support
for the hypothesis that televised pro-smoking advertisements significantly
increased youth smoking.
Several researchers have hypothesized that studying the impact of
advertising and promotion bans on cigarette smoking would provide more
direct evidence on the impact of advertising. Many of the older studies
examined the impact of the United States ban on broadcast cigarette

8

9See Kenneth E. Warner, CigaretteAdvertisingandMediaCoverageofSmoking
and Health, 312 NEw ENG. J. MED. 384 (1985); Kenneth E. Warner & Linda M.
Goldenhar, The CigaretteAdvertising BroadcastBan and Magazine Coverage of
Smoking andHealth,10 J. PuB. H-ALTH POL'Y 32 (1992).
" Kenneth E. Warner et al., CigaretteAdvertising andMagazine Coverage of
the Hazardsof Smoking: A StatisticalAnalysis,326 NEW ENG. J. MED. 305, 307
(1992).
91 Id.
92 See Simon Chapman, The Limitations ofEconometricAnalysis in Cigarette
Advertising Studies, 84 BRrr. J. ADDICTION 1267 (1989).
93 Lewit et al., supra note 38.
94Id.
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advertising that began January 2, 1971 .9 In general, these studies produced
mixed evidence on the impact of the ban on television and radio advertising. Most concluded that the ban did not significantly reduce cigarette
smoking in the United States. Several, including Hamilton and Warner,
suggested that the net impact of the 1971 ban was to raise cigarette
consumption because it also led to the elimination of effective anti-smoking
commercials broadcast under the Fairness Doctrine. 96 Schneider et al.
supported this argument empirically, concluding that the advertising ban
led to a net increase of nearly five percent in per capita tobacco consumption, in part due to a price reduction resulting from the reduced costs
associated with less advertising.9 7 In addition, they argued, the advertising
ban limited the provision of information to smokers concerning the tar and
nicotine content of different brands and, consequently, reduced the
98
likelihood that smokers would switch to lower tar and nicotine brands.

95 See W.L. SIMONICH, GOVERNMENT ANTISMOKING POLICIES (1991); Badi H.
Baltagi & Dan Levin, EstimatingDynamic Demandfor Cigarettes Using Panel
Data: The Effects of Bootlegging, Taxation, and Advertising Reconsidered, 68
REv. ECON. STAT. 148 (1986); John A. Bishop & Jang H. Yao, "HealthScare, "
Excise Taxes, and Advertising Ban in the CigaretteDemand and Supply, 52 S.
ECON. J. 402 (1985); George R. Franke, U.S. Cigarette Demand, 1961-90:
EconometricIssues,Evidence,andlmplications,30 J.Bus.REs. 33 (1994); Rajeev
K. Goel & Mathew J. Morey, The Interdependence of Cigarette and Liquor
Demand, 62 S. ECON. J. 451 (1995); Richard A. Ippolito et al., Fed. Trade
Comm'n, Bureau of Econ., Staff Report on Consumer Responses to Cigarette
HealthInformation(1979); K. Ka6 &V.J. Tremblay, Comment, Cigarette"Health
Scare," Excise Tax, and Advertising Ban, 54 S. ECON. J. 770 (1988); Robert
McAuliffe, The FTCand the Effectiveness of CigaretteAdvertising Regulations,
7 J. Pu3. POL'Y & MARKETING 46 (1988); R.H. Porter, The ImpactofGovernment
Policy on the U.S. CigaretteIndustry, in EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO CONSUMER
PROTECTION ECONOMICS (Richard A. Ippolito & D.T. Scheffman eds., 1986); L.

Schneider et al., Government Regulationof CigaretteHealthInformation,24 J.L.
& ECON. 575 (1981); Barry J. Seldon & Roy Boyd, The Stability of Cigarette
Demand, 23 APPLIED EcoN. 319 (1991); Barry J. Seldon & Khosrow Doroodian,
A Simultaneous Model of CigaretteAdvertising:Effects on Demand and Industry
Response to PublicPolicy, 71 REv. ECON. STAT. 673 (1989); Carol H. Tremblay
& Victor J. Tremblay, The ImpactofCigaretteAdvertising on ConsumerSurplus,
Profit,
andSocial Welfare, 13 CONTEMP. ECON. POL'Y 113 (1995).
96 See
James L. Hamilton, The Demandfor Cigarettes:Advertising,the Health
Scare, and the Cigarette Advertising Ban, 54 REv. ECON. STAT. 401 (1972);
Kenneth E. Warner, Clearingthe Airwaves: The CigaretteAd Ban Revisited, 5
POL'Y ANALYSIS 435 (1979).
97 Schneider et al., supra note 95.
98 Id.

2001-2002]

TOBACCO CONSUMPTION

1037

A recent study using data from twenty-two high-income countries, for
the period from 1970 through 1992, provides strong evidence that
comprehensive bans on cigarette advertising and promotion lead to
significant reductions in cigarette smoking. The study predicted that a
comprehensive set of tobacco advertising bans in high-income countries
could reduce tobacco consumption by over six percent.99 However, the
study concludes that partial bans have little impact on smoking behavior,
given that the tobacco industry can shift its resources from the banned
media source (e.g., television) to those that are not banned.'
Approaches employed by other disciplines, including survey research
and experiments that assess reactions to and recall of cigarette advertising,
support the hypothesis that increases in cigarette advertising and promotion
directly and indirectly increase cigarette demand. For example, research has
shown that children and adolescents are highly exposed to these tobacco
industry advertisements;'0 ' they can recognize cigarette advertising symbols
and campaigns; " a large proportion of adolescents are receptive to tobacco
industry advertising and promotional activities; °3 and that receptivity
increases the likelihood of future experimentation with cigarettes.'O These
studies conclude that cigarette advertising is effective in getting and
retaining children's attention, with the strength of these associations
strongly correlated with current smoking behavior, smoking initiation, and
smoking intentions.
Others have articulated logical arguments that conclude that cigarette
advertising and promotional activities are not consistent with the tobacco
industry's claim that the market for tobacco products is mature and that
marketing activities are designed to promote brand share rather than market

99 Henry Safer & Frank J. Chaloupka, The Effect of Advertising Bans on
Tobacco Consumption, 19 J. HEALTH ECoN. 1117 (2000).
"Id. at 1134.
oI See Elizabeth A. Gilpin et al., Are Adolescents Receptive to CurrentSales
PromotionPracticesofthe TobaccoIndustry?, 26 PREVENTIVE MED. 14 (1997).
102 See generally Lucy L. Henke, Young Children'sPerceptions of Cigarette
BrandAdvertisingSymbols: Awareness, Affect, and TargetMarketIdentification,
XXIV J. ADVER. 13 (1995); Charles King III et al., Adolescent Exposure to
CigaretteAdvertising in Magazines:An EvaluationofBrand-SpecificAdvertising
in Relation to Youth Readership,279 JAMA 516 (1998).
103 See Nicola Evans et al., Influence of Tobacco Marketing andExposure to
SmokingonAdolescent Susceptibilityto Smoking, 87 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 1538
(1995); Gilpin et al., supra note 101.
104 See John P. Pierce et al., Tobacco Industry Promotion of Cigarettes and
Adolescent Smoking, 279 JAMA 511 (1998).
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expansion. For example, Tye and his colleagues calculated that cigarette
firms' battling only for brand share did not make financial sense in a United
States market in which the top two firms now control seventy-five percent
of cigarette sales (and one company has ninety-five percent of smokeless
tobacco sales) and in which brand loyalty is notoriously strong.'015 The
authors argued that if the industry believed its own brand-share argument,
it would have welcomed the opportunity for a legislated ban on tobacco
advertising, proposed in the United States Congress in the mid-1980s.
Instead, the industry fought the ban vigorously. Similarly, Warner noted
that even if the industry is a mature or declining one, retaining existing
consumers and recruiting new ones would be particularly important in the
cigarette market in which about five percent of consumers are lost annually
to cessation and death." 6 Finally, while the overall market may be mature,
there are segments of the market that appear to be potential growth markets,
such as youth in the United States, for whom smoking prevalence has risen
throughout the 1990s, or specific minority groups, such as Hispanic
females, for whom smoking rates are well below those of other groups of
women. 0 7 Substantial evidence, including recently released internal
industry documents, indicates that increasing shares of advertising and
promotion activities have been directed toward these growth or potential
08
growth markets.1
Clearly, there is no "smoking gun" that proves that advertising and
promotion play a significant role in expanding or maintaining the market
for tobacco products, or that they do not. Examining all of the evidence
collectively, Warner concluded that it is more likely than not that advertising and promotions do stimulate cigarette consumption.' 09 However, he also
"I See Joe B. Tye et al., Tobacco Advertising and Consumption: Evidence of
a CausalRelationship, 8 J. PUB. HEALTH POL'Y 492, 493-95 (1987).
1o6 See WARNER, supranote 85, at 64.
'

07 See

Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Nat'l Ctr. for Chronic Disease

Prevention & Health Promotion, Off. on Smoking & Health, U.S. Dep't of Health
& Hum. Servs., Tobacco Use Among U.S. Racial/Ethnic Minority Groups: A
Report of the Surgeon General (1998) [hereinafter Tobacco Use Among U.S.
Racial/Ethnic
Minority Groups].
'08 SeePreventingTobacco UseAmong YoungPeople, supranote 15; Reducing
the Health Consequences of Smoking, supra note 8; Tobacco Use Among U.S.
RacialEthnicMinority Groups,supranote 107; King et al., supra note 102; Univ.
of Ky. Dep't of Health, Econ. & Operational Res. Div., Effect of Tobacco
Advertising on Tobacco Consumption: A Discussion Document Reviewing the
Evidence (1992).
109 Warner, supranote 85, at 74.
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characterized the extent of the influence of advertising as unknown and
possibly unknowable. While the collective evidence does demonstrate that
increased advertising leads to increased tobacco use, states are limited in
their abilities to regulate advertising given the constitutional protection
afforded free speech. Nevertheless, states like Massachusetts have tested
these limits, albeit not always successfully."

VI. COMPREHENSIVE STATE PROGRAMS
AS A POLICY LEVER TO REDUCE TOBACCO CONSUMPTION
In recent years, several state governments have adopted comprehensive
programs to reduce tobacco use, often funded by earmarked tobacco tax
revenues. These programs generally have consistent goals for reducing
tobacco use including: preventing initiation among youth and young adults;
promoting cessation among all smokers; reducing exposure to secondhand
smoke; and identifying and eliminating disparities among population
subgroups."' In general, these programs have one or more of four key
components: (1) national and community interventions; (2) counter
marketing campaigns; (3) policy and regulation; and (4) surveillance and
evaluation. Programs have placed differing emphasis on these four
components, with substantial diversity among the types of activities
supported within each component. Recent analyses from the United States
and the United Kingdom clearly indicate that these comprehensive efforts
have been successful in reducing tobacco use and in improving public
health."' In California, for example, the state's comprehensive tobacco
control program has doubled the rate of decline in tobacco use seen in the
rest of the U.S." 3 California lung cancer incidence has fallen by fourteen
110 In 1999, Massachusetts adopted regulations restricting advertising of
tobacco products, that included: a ban on advertising in enclosed stadiums, a ban
on outdoor advertising at any location within a 1000-foot radius of a public
playground or a school, and a ban on indoor advertising below five feet in retail
stores within the same radius. Most of the provisions of the law were struck down,
in a 5-4 decision, by the U.S. Supreme Court in June 2001 as a violation of the
First Amendment. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
11See Reducing Tobacco Use, supra note 2.
112 See id.; Townsend, UK Smoking Targets, supra note 62; Melanie A.
Wakefield & Frank J. Chaloupka, Effectiveness of Comprehensive Tobacco
Control Programmesin Reducing Teenage Smoking in the USA, 9 TOBACCO
CONTROL 177 (2000).

" J.P. PIERCE ET AL., TOBACCO CONTROL INCALIFORNIA: WHO'S WINNING THE
WAR? ANEVALUATION OFTHETOBACCO CONTROL PROGRAM, 1989-1996 (1998).
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percent from 1988 to 1997.
In contrast, declines of 2.7% have been seen in
4
the rest of the country."
Similarly, the WHO MONICA Project, a multinational effort to
monitor trends and determinants of cardiovascular disease, showed that
decreases in smoking prevalence were largest in countries where the public
is consistently reminded of the dangers of smoking by extensive coverage
of issues related to tobacco in the news media."' Media coverage was one
part of a comprehensive approach to smoking control in these countries that
combined tobacco taxes, smoke-free indoor air policies, antismoking
advocacy, litigation against tobacco companies, and restrictions on the
promotion and sale of tobacco products in order to change the dynamics of
the smoking epidemic. Furthermore, MONICA data suggests that the
decrease in smoking prevalence observed among men in some countries is
6
due to the higher prevalence of never smoking in younger age groups."
Among women, increasing prevalence of smoking in younger age cohorts
counterbalanced increasing prevalence of former smokers in older age
7
groups to yield little overall change in prevalence."
Clearly, more significant decreases inthe proportion of smokers among
men and women could be achieved by implementing comprehensive
tobacco control programs that discourage young people from initiating
smoking. The extent to which comprehensive programs can prevent young
people from becoming persistent smokers today will affect mortality rates
in the middle or second half of the twenty-first century."8 Mortality rates
in the near future and throughout the first half of the century, however,
could be reduced by aiding current smokers in becoming nonsmokers. A
recent study from the UK found that smoking cessation before middle age
avoids more than ninety percent of the lung cancer mortality risk attributable to tobacco." 9
"4 Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep't of
Health & Hum.
Servs., Declines in Lung CancerRates--California,1988-1997,49MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1066, 1067 (2000).
"' See Anu Molarius et al., Trends in CigaretteSmoking in 36 Populations

From the Early 1980s to the Mid-1990s: Findings From the WHO MONICA
Project,91 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 206, 210 (2001).
116Id.
See Richard Peto et al., Smoking, Smoking Cessation, andLung Cancerin
the UK Since 1950: Combination ofNational Statistics with Two Case Control
Studies, 321 BRrr. MED. J. 323 (2000).
18
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Despite strong evidence that comprehensive approaches to tobacco
control can effectively reduce smoking, and therefore diminish the social
and economic burdens of tobacco use, even the best-funded comprehensive
tobacco control programs in the United States fall short of optimal funding
guidelines for tobacco control. Current estimates of the costs of implementing a comprehensive tobacco control program in the United States range
from seven dollars to twenty dollars per capita in smaller states (less than
three million population); six dollars to seventeen dollars per capita in
medium-sized states (three to seven million population); and five dollars to
sixteen dollars per capita in larger states (greater than seven million
population).120 At the highest recommended spending level for the United
States, annual funding for a comprehensive tobacco program would equal
only 0.9% of United States public spending per capita on health. While the
Center for Disease Control ("CDC") recommends spending $6.42 - $17.88
per capita for tobacco prevention and cessation in Kentucky, the state MSA
funds designated for tobacco control ($.64 per capita) account for only ten
percent of the lower CDC estimate.
Comprehensive tobacco control programs including research funded by
tobacco product taxes are self-financing. Therefore, the most obvious
constraint would be political opposition, but this is difficult to quantify. A
key political tool for addressing political opposition is an earmarked
tobacco tax. However, earmarking introduces clear restrictions and
inefficiencies on public finance. For this reason alone, most
macroeconomists do not favor earmarking, no matter how worthythe cause.
Nonetheless, analysis suggests that the efficiency losses from earmarking
tobacco taxes would be minimal.' Earmarking could be justified if
governments used these funds for services that would not have been
otherwise used. However, earmarked taxes also have a political function,
in that they help to concentrate political winners of tobacco control, and
thus influence policy. Earmarked funds that support broad health and social
services (such as other disease programs) broaden the political and civil
society support base for tobacco control. In Australia, broad political
support among Ministries of Sports and Education helped to convince the
Ministry of Finance that raising tobacco taxes was possible. Indeed, once
Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Nat'l Ctr. for Chronic Disease
Prevention &Health Promotion, Off. on Smoking &Health, U.S. Dep't ofHealth
120

& Hum.
Servs., Investment in Tobacco Control:State Highlights2001 (2001).
21
See T-w Hu et al., Earmare Tobacco Taxes: LessonsLearned,in I. ABEDIAN
ETAL., supranote 62, at 102-18.
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an earmarked tax was passed, the Ministry of Finance went on to raise
tobacco taxes further without earmarking them."z
Allocating tobacco taxes to other health programs for the poorest
socioeconomic groups could produce "double health gains"--reduced
tobacco consumption and increased access to and use of health services. In
Kentucky, a ten percent increase in cigarette taxes would decrease
consumption by five percent and increase government revenues by five
percent. These increased earnings could finance a package of essential
health services for Kentucky's poorest citizens.
CONCLUSION

We know what policy levers work to reduce tobacco use, the single
most preventable cause of death in the United States, and we have the
ability to pass laws that significantly reduce tobacco consumption, as
evidenced by documented outcomes in California, Massachusetts, and
many other states. There is strong evidence that tobacco tax increases,
strong and comprehensive restrictions on smoking in public places and
workplaces, comprehensive bans on advertising and promotion, and wellfunded, sustained comprehensive tobacco prevention and cessation
programs are effective in reducing tobacco use. Despite this evidence, these
policies have been unevenly applied, partly due to political constraints and
lack of awareness of the power of interventions. This Article has highlighted one tobacco growing and manufacturing state that exemplifies the
struggle between economic interests and public health. Although overwhelming scientific evidence exists that four major policy levers are
effective in reducing tobacco use, many states, including Kentucky, have
failed to adopt such policies. Instead, the laws that do exist in these states
are weak and ineffective. In many of these states, the focus tends to be on
minimizing the economic impact on tobacco growing and manufacturing,
rather than on reducing the public health toll caused by tobacco. While the
economic impact of declining tobacco use is very real to communities in
Kentucky and other tobacco growing states, the health and economic
consequences of failing to act are substantial.

122 IRL. Galbally, Health-PromotingEnvironments: Who Will Miss Out?, 21
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